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Laws or Men ?
Is Government of Laws Being Superseded by Government of Partisans?-Decision by Court of Appeals in
Philadelphia Permits Labor to Restrain Interstate
Commerce With Impunity-Election of Judges for
14-Year Term Would Be Better IfPolitics Is to Invade
the Federal Judiciary

By DAVID LAWRENCE
NEVER before in the whole history of the United States has interpretation of the fundamental law of the land by the judiciary been so
enveloped in confusion and conflict. Have we a government of laws
or of men, of principles or factionalism, of fundamental concepts or
whimsical expediency?
For awhile the clash of viewpoints on constitutional law could
be classified as "liberal" and "conservative."
It seemed merely a basic
antagonism of rival philosophies and as such could be dignified as intellectually plausible.
But what shall we say of a three-judge Circuit Court of Appeals
-all
appointed during the New Deal-which disregards the trend
of judicial thought of the Supreme Court of the United States even
as recently "liberalized," and goes back to the days of the "conservative" court to find convenient precedents with which to permit a labor
union guilty of a "sit-down" strike to escape punishment under the
anti-trust laws?
To expand the federal power under the commerce clause of the
Constitution so as to protect labor came as a surprise in 1937 when
the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the Wagner labor law
but the decision was accepted as somehow an evolution necessary under
our system of government so as to enable the federal authority to
protect interstate commerce against a recurrence of strikes believed to
be due to the refusal of industrialists to grant collective bargaining.
But now when a C.I.O. union is caught in the
of the law having plainly interfered with
clutches
YARDSTICK
and stopped interstate commerce the Circuit Court
FOR LABOR
of Appeals in Philadelphia, consisting of three
judges appointed under the Roosevelt Administration, tells the public that a "sit-down" strike, notwithstanding its "effect" on interstate
commerce, did not "restrain" such commerce in a legal sense, or at
least that the union couldn't possibly have meant it that way. Another
*Reprinted from the United States News, an independent weekly dealing with
National Affairs, published at Washington. D. C.
A DIFFERENT
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set of judges in the same court held just the opposite less than two
years ago.
One judicial yardstick for industry and another for labor? Will
not the federal judiciary under the New Deal be accused now of having
"economic predilections" in its basic interpretation of the law?
Maybe a politically chosen judiciary is inevitable. If so, then
the system in vogue in the state of New York in selecting members
of the Court of Appeals would be far better than appointment for
life on the federal bench. The people can better be trusted to choose
judges at elections through a bi-partisan nominating system for a term
of 14 years than a single administration can be allowed to select judges
who will be able for a lifetime to deal partisanly with the fundamental
laws of the land.
This criticism of the Circuit Court of Appeals members is not
in any sense directed at individuals.
It is directed against a trend
which has been slowly developing among the Administration's appointees to the federal bench and which has not been as palpably revealed heretofore as in the decision last week on the Apex case by the
Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
The court held to be sure that anti-trust laws
REVERSAL OF
TE NEW DEAL could be applied to the activities of labor unions
but that in the Apex case the labor unions' conduct
POSITION
of a "sit-down strike" while reprehensible, did not
"restrain" interstate commerce to a sufficient extent to constitute a
violation of the anti-trust laws.
The criterion, it was pointed out, was the "extent and intent of
the interference with commerce considered against the background of
social consequences."
The three judges ruled there was no extensive
interference even though it was proved that the company did an annual
business of $5,000,000 and bought all of its raw materials and shipped
80 per cent of its completed merchandise in interstate commerce. And,
what was worse, the court said there was no restraint for the purpose of
the anti-trust laws on interstate commerce even though the strikers
by seizing the plant actually prevented the shipment of 13.4,000 dozens
of finished hosiery, about 80 per cent of which had been consigned to
firms in other states. To ignore such pressing actualities the court
must indeed have wrapped itself in exactly the judicial "intellectual
vacuum" which the Supreme Court has condemned for purposes of
evaluating effects on interstate commerce.
Anybody who has been reading the cases growing out of the
National Labor Relations Act knows how time and again the courts
recite the fact that a business which ships even a small portion of its
materials in or out of interstate commerce becomes subject to the
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Wagner law on the theory that a strike might possibly interrupt commerce.
A theoretical strike, a potential strike, a strike not yet born can
"affect" and, indeed, may impair interstate commerce to such an extent
that nearly every business establishment today has come under federal
jurisdiction. Still actual physical interruption occasioned by men who
seize property and stop shipments is not a "restraint" of interstate
commerce according to the Third Circuit.
Could anything more clearly indicate a government of men rather
than laws-whim rather than principle?
Will not laymen tend to lose confidence in a federal judiciary
which disregards at will even doctrines established by the so-called
"liberal" majority of the Supreme Court of the United States?
It is difficult to reconcile the decision in the
Apex case by the Third Circuit with many of the
precedents established by the Supreme Court of the
United States prior to 1937. When upholding the
constitutionality of the Wagner Act in a 5 to 4 opinion in 1937, Chief
Justice Hughes took the "second Coronado case" as his buttressing
argument. The Supreme Court had held, he said, in that instance
that there was evidence, lacking in the "first Coronado case," to prove
that the property destroyed by the unions was destroyed to prevent
employers from shipping coal in interstate commerce. Consequently
Congress, he declared, had the power to select compulsory collective
bargaining as a means of protecting interstate commerce.
But the Apex case actually involves not only a destruction of
production facilities but also a deliberate refusal by the unions to permit
goods ready for shipment to move into interstate commerce. Here is
an obviously successful attempt at interference with commerce. And
yet the laws prohibiting restraint of trade are held not applicable.
How was this done? By simply indulging in a bit of curious
reasoning. The Circuit Court judges said that the "second Coronado
case" did not apply because the amount of coal excluded from interstate
commerce was a factor, yet any close reading of the Supreme Court's
own words in the "second Coronado case" shows that it emphasized
the volume of coal, not on the question of the extent of restraint necessary under the Sherman Act, but on the question of sufficiency of the
evidence to show intent to restrain interstate commerce.
But even if the Apex decision be considered as consistent with
the "second Coronado case," it is difficult to reconcile what the Third
Circuit said last week with recent cases involving the National Labor
Relations Act. The Third Circuit Court took cognizance of a possible
raising of this question by announcing that the Wagner Act cases
RULING IS
CONTRARY TO
PRECEDENTS
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turned on the use of the word "affect" in that law and that "affecting"
interstate commerce is different from "restraining" interstate commerce. Hence, it said, the scope of the: Wagner Act is broader than
that of the anti-trust laws.
Unquestionably the word "affect" has a broad
IS RESTRAINT
connotation but in the Wagner Act the
general
or
A MATTER
word "affect" was used in a particular sense, "affectOF INTENT?
ing commerce" being specifically defined by Congress
And the Supreme Court
as "burdening or obstructing commerce."
of the United States in 1937 went far in brushing aside all previous
decisions to say that a possible strike due to labor trouble could be and
really did constitute a direct effect on interstate commerce.
In the Apex case, on the other hand, we have as direct an effect
on interstate commerce as could be imagined-a physical interruption
by acts of violence. Still the Third Circuit Court is content to condemn such lawless performance with vehement words, refusing to
permit a decision rendered in 1937 by the same Third Circuit Court
composed of different judges to stand now.
The Third Circuit Court endeavors to justify its decision by declaring that the purpose of the "sit-down" strikers was ,not at all to
interrupt interstate commerce but to carry on a labor dispute and that
the stoppage of the shipments and the seizure of the plant were steps
incidental to the conduct of the strike itself. Apologies here should
be made to Secretary Perkins, former Governor Murphy, of Michigan,
John L. Lewis and all others who were bitterly criticised in 1937 for
believing that the "sit-down" strike might some day day win the court's
tolerance.
Under such a twisted concept of the law, as the Third Circuit
now invokes, "sit-down" strikes could be carried on almost with impunity. It avails little that the Apex Company is advised now to sue
in the Pennsylvania state courts-a sort of passing of the buck to the
states. But if this is right and if everything written here about inconsistency with previous precedents is wrong, then hereafter may we
expect the same Third Circuit Court to declare invalid various provisions of the Wagner law and to advise labor unions to seek redress in
state courts when employers refuse to grant collective bargaining privileges?
The Third Circuit Court gave no effect to the words of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the Jones & Laughlin case:
"The fact that there appears to have been no major disturbance in that industry (the steel industry) in the more
recent period did not dispose of the possibilities of future
and like dangers to interstate commerce which Congress was
entitled to foresee and could exercise its protective power to
forestall."
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Again in the recent Fainblatt case, the Supreme Court said:
"Nor do we think it important, as respondents seem to
argue, that the volume of the commerce here involved, though
substantial, was relatively small as compared with that in the
cases arising under the National Labor Relations Act which
have hitherto engaged our attention. The power of Congress
to regulate interstate commerce is plenary and extends to all
such commerce be it great or small ...
"The exercise of congressional power under the Sherman
Act, the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act,
or the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, has never been
thought to be constitutionally restricted because in any particular case the volume of the commerce affected may be small.
Here then in two separate citations we find support for the principle that neither small volume of business entering interstate commerce in a given case nor absence of a major disturbance prevents the
exercise by Congress of its power to protect interstate commerce against
interference. In the Apex case there was a major disturbance; likewise
80 per cent of the production was kept out of interstate commerce by
physical violence. The two most important elements were present but
still commerce was held not restrained. Possibly it wasn't even "affected."
But let us look at a decision last week by the
CONFIDENCE
Circuit Court of Appeals in the Seventh Circuit,
DICIARY
I
where it was held that a milk wagon driver's union
IS WEAKENED
had violated the Sherman and Clayton anti-trust
laws by interfering with interstate commerce through the picketing
of dairy stores in Chicago. This court said:
"We think it is clear that interstate commerce was involved and was quite seriously affected and burdened by the
picketing activities of the defendants in and about the stores
that sold the milk in controversy. ...
"We think that their acts did constitute an unlawful
conspiracy within the purview of the Sherman and the Clayton Acts."
What then is the law? Is it what any judges say it shall be?
This evidently is the New Deal concept. Give us the judges and we
will make the laws-so runs the philosophy of economic partisans
who thus fan the flames of internal discord and hasten the days when
civil strife in America becomes intensified even as confidence in the
judiciary disintegrates.
We are in the midst of a civil war today between capital and
labor. Violence in picketing and "sit downs" and "slow downs" are
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weapons far more dangerous than any alleged economic inequality sought
to be corrected by the Wagner law. The "slow-down" strike was used
with impunity in the Chrysler dispute which cost the nation many
millions of dollars. Yet not a single labor leader will ever be held to
accountability under federal law for bringing on this huge economic
loss to society. Certainly not if we have any more decisions like that
rendered by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
Confidence in the judiciary is a prerequisite to democracy. We
cannot escape the conclusion that what three recently-named judges
have done in the Apex case will cast suspicion on the so-called "reconstruction" or reorganization of the federal judiciary. Perhaps it is
ironical proof that the extremists, economic radicals and economic
conservatives, when they acquire judicial power are merely brothers

under the skin.

BAR INTEGRATION
Colorado Bar Is Virtually Integrated
The most recent developments in the Colorado bar raised the
question, "when is a state bar integrated?" The test heretofore has been
the application of rules, whether statutory or judicial in origin, that
impose upon every practitioner a definite obligation. The obligation
most readily observed is that of contributing to the cost of bar regulation. The Colorado situation is unique; almost every practitioner in
the state is now contributing to the cost of maintaining both local and
state bar associations. It was told in this Journal a year ago how
the Colorado State Bar Association had provided for dual membership
and control of the state organization by members of.a board of governors
to be elected by the members of local associations. Dues for individual
memberships were fixed at six dollars and dues paid by locals for their
members at three dollars. Most of the local associations became affiliated
under this democratic plan immediately, and in advance of the annual
meeting held September 22-23 this year it was announced that the
last two local associations, one of which had just been organized, had
become affiliated, so that the State Association now includes every lawyer
in the state except a few in mountainous counties where there are not
enough to justify local organization.
It is fair to assume that a third route to bar integration exists.
Labels are not consequential; the status is the vital matter. The Colorado state bar is now so nearly unanimous as to deserve to be included
in the list of integrated state bars. Its recent history should stimulate
lawyers in such states as Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode
Island and Delaware to follow the Colorado example.
(From Journal of The American Judicature Society, December, 1939.)

